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ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 971660-CA 
v. : 
JEFFREY AFFHOLTER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and sentence entered on guilty pleas to the charges 
of failure to stop on an officer's signal, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1998); attempt to alter or remove vin, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1318 (1998); attempted escape, a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-309 (1999); driving under the 
influence, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 
1997); and criminal mischief, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-106(l)(c) (Supp. 1997) (in Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Absent any argument or authority from defendant, should this Court abandon 
established precedent and let defendant withdraw his valid, voluntarily-entered guilty 
pleas solely on the basis of post-sentencing "buyer's remorse?" 
This issue presents a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See State 
vJPena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) (questions of law are reviewed for correctness). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated, section 77-13-6 (1999), is the only statutory provision 
pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on appeal and is contained in Addendum 
B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Jeffrey Affholter was originally charged with eight offenses committed 
on June 18, 1997 (R. 2-5, 37-39). On June 27, 1997, he was charged with three additional 
offenses (R. 39). On August 6, 1997, defendant pleaded guilty to: failure to respond to an 
officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony; attempt to alter or remove a vin, a third 
degree felony; operating a vehicle while under the influence, a class B misdemeanor; 
attempted escape from official custody, a class A misdemeanor; and criminal mischief, a 
class B misdemeanor (R. 25-26, 39-40,44-45). At that time, he was represented by 
David Perry (R. 25). The district court subsequently sentenced defendant to serve 
concurrent prison terms of zero-to-five years for each of the third degree felonies, one 
2 
year at the county jail for the class A misdemeanor, and six months at the county jail for 
each of the class B misdemeanors (R. 48-49, 106-08). The judgment, sentence and 
commitment was entered on October 2, 1997 (R. 48-49, 106-08). 
Two weeks later, on October 16, 1997, the district court received a letter from 
defendant, who was acting pro se at that time (R. 50-51) (in Add. C). The district court 
treated the letter as a notice of appeal (R. 84). While on appeal, defendant was appointed 
his present counsel, who took the position that defendant's October 16 letter should be 
construed not only as his notice of appeal, but also as a motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas (R. 66, 75-76). The Utah Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the district court 
for determination of the withdrawal issue (R. 86). 
On July 27, 1998, the district court held a hearing on defendant's motion, at which 
the parties were given the opportunity to argue the timeliness and the merits of 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas (R. 92-93). At that hearing, the district 
court denied defendant's motion, but did not enter a final signed, written order until July 
21, 1999 (R. 93, 100-02). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
After a short pursuit by police on June 18, 1997, defendant was stopped driving a 
stolen car (R. 7). He failed field sobriety tests and did not possess a valid driver's license 
(id.). On July 29, 1997, defendant attempted to escape from the Cache County Jail (R. 
29). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant fails to provide argument or support for his assertion that this Court 
should ignore long-standing precedent and permit withdrawal of guilty pleas as a matter 
of course when a defendant suffers "general but unarticulated dissatisfaction with the 
sentence imposed by the trial court.v Defendant does not claim ignorance of the trial 
court's authority to reject sentencing recommendations and concedes that there was no 
rule 11 violation in the taking of his guilty pleas. Accordingly, this Court should reject 
defendant's claim on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT DEPART FROM ESTABLISHED 
LAW GOVERNING WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEAS 
WITHOUT ANY SUPPORTIVE REASONING OR MEANINGFUL 
ANALYSIS 
Defendant seeks a ruling that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas for the sole 
reason that he suffered "dissatisfaction" with the sentence ultimately imposed below. Br. 
of Aplt. at 18. He contends that this Court need only disavow its ruling in State v. Price, 
837 P.2d 578 (Utah App. 1992), to enable him to withdraw his pleas in this case. Id. at 
18. 
In Price, this Court interpreted Utah Code Annotated, section 77-13-6 (1999), 
which sets a thirty-day deadline after entry of a plea for moving to withdraw guilty pleas, 
and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e) and (f), which requires the trial court to 
inform defendant of the thirty-day time limit for withdrawing his pleas. This Court 
4 
determined that when a defendant is advised of the thirty-day time limit for filing a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the time limit is jurisdictional, and a failure to file a 
motion to withdraw within that time limit deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to hear 
the motion. LI at 583; Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(7)(e) & (f). 
Defendants asking this Court to overturn prior precedent '"have a substantial 
burden of persuasion . . . mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis.'" State v. DeCorso, 
1999 UT 57,1f 83, 993 P.2d 837 (quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 
1994), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115 (1995)), cert, denied, 120 S. Ct. 1181 (2000). A court 
"'may overrule its own . . . decision where the decision is clearly erroneous or conditions 
have changed so as to render the prior decision inapplicable.'" DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, f 
83, 993 P.2d 837 (quoting Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n.3) (additional quotation omitted). 
Defendant makes no attempt to meet this burden, presenting his request in a single 
sentence in his conclusion. Br. of Aplt. at 18. Further, the decision in Price does not 
appear to be clearly erroneous on its face, and conditions have not so clearly changed 
since issuance of Price as to render the decision inapplicable in guilty plea cases. As 
defendant fails to justify his request that Price be overruled, this Court should refuse to 
make his arguments for him. See Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 354-55 
(Utah 1997) (refusing to make a defendant's arguments to overturn prior case law where 
defendant did not himself make any argument). Moreover, this Court recently reaffirmed 
5 
Price in State v. Ostler, 2000 UT App 28, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 43, and State v. 
TarnawieckL 2000 UT App 186.1 
Even if this Court ignored the jurisdictional mandate of Price; defendant would 
still not be entitled to withdraw his pleas. Despite noting that the alleged withdrawal 
request was untimely, the trial court reached the merits, finding that defendant's pleas 
were entered knowingly and voluntarily and that defendant failed to establish any basis 
upon which the court could permit withdrawal of the pleas (R. 101-02). Defendant has 
not provided a transcript of the hearing for this Court's review, and he concedes on appeal 
that there was no rule 11 violation which would invalidate the pleas. Br. of Aplt. at 17, 
{^65. He also makes no allegation on appeal of good cause which, if true, would entitle 
him to withdraw the pleas. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6. Neither the record nor 
defendant's argument shows that anything unusual or exceptional occurred sufficient to 
warrant withdrawal of the pleas. 
What defendant really desires is a ruling by this Court that a defendant is entitled 
to withdraw his valid, voluntarily-entered guilty plea if, after, sentencing, he suffers 
"buyer's remorse." To so rule would be to abandon the entire body of law in this area, 
and defendant offers no justification for doing so. Indeed, the law in this area has 
developed in an effort to deal with the myriad of claims of "buyer's remorse" advanced 
]The State has filed a petition for writ of certiorari in Ostler, and is reviewing the 
same option in Tarnaweicki. 
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by defendants over the years. See Summers v. Cook. 759 P.2d 341, 342 (Utah App. 
1988). Absent some effort to justify such a drastic deviation from established law, this 
Court should decline defendant's invitation. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Because this case presents no complex or novel questions, the State does not 
request that it be set for oral argument or that a published opinion issue. 




KRIS C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Titles 39 to 46 
41-la-1318. Second degree felony — Fraudulent alter-
ation of identification number. 
(1) It is a second degree felony for a person with fraudulent intent to: 
(a) deface, destroy, or alter the identification number or state assigned 
identification number of a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer; 
(b) place or stamp, without authority by the division, something other 
than the original identification or state assigned identification number 
upon a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer; or 
(c) sell or offer for sale a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer bearing an 
altered or defaced identification or state assigned identification number 
other than the original or the state assigned identification number. 
(2) This section does not prevent any manufacturer, importer, or any agent, 
other than a dealer, from placing or stamping in the ordinary course of 
business numbers on motor vehicles, trailers, or semitrailers registered under 
this chapter. 
(3) This section does not prohibit the restoration by an owner of an original 
identification number when the restoration is made under permit issued by the 
division. 
History: L. 1935, ch . 46, * 57; 1937, ch. 65, bered by L. 1992, ch . 1, $ 175. 
* 1; C. 1943, 57-3a-58; L. 1955, ch . 66, * 1; 
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Titles 39 to 46 
41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop — 
Fleeing — Causing property damage or bodily 
injury — Suspension of driver's license — Forfei-
ture of vehicle — Penalties. 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a peace 
officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or wanton, 
disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of any' 
vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or 
other means is guilty of a felony of the third degree. The court shall, as part of 
any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not less than $1,000. 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death 
or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amounting 
to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second degree. The 
court shall, as part of any sentence under this subsection, impose a fine of not 
less than $5,000. 
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other 
section, an operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from 
a peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful 
or wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the 
operation of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace 
officer by vehicle or other means, shall have his driver's license revoked 
pursuant to Subsection 53-3-220(1 XaXix) for a period of one year. 
(b) The court shall collect the driver's license to be revoked and forward 
it to the Division of Drivers' License Services, along with a report of the 
conviction. If the court is unable to collect the driver's license, the court 
shall nevertheless forward the report to the division. If the person is the 
holder of a driver's license from another jurisdiction, the court shall not 
collect the driver's license but shall notify the division and the division 
shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing state. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-13.5, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, ft 38; L. 1981, ch. 269, § 1; 1987, 
ch. 138, ft 6; 1993, ch. 71, ft 1; 1995, ch. 20, 
ft 89. 
41-6-44L Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concen-
tration — Measurement of blood or breath alco-
hol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revoca-
tion of license, 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reck-
less driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related 
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments 
administered under 10 U.S.C. 815; 
(b) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordi-
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
and 
(c) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) 
is guilty of a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor; or 
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or 
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time 
of the offense. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not 
less than 24 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate; and 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) For a violation committed after July 1,1993, the court may order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilita-
tion facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility determines that the person has a problem condition involving 
alcohol or drugs. 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within six years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not 
less than 80 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program, 
the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educa-
tional series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate; and 
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six 
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a: 
(i) class A misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (ii); and 
(ii) third degree felony if at least: 
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after 
April 23, 1990; or 
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after 
July 1, 1996. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a fine of not less than $2,000 and impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to work in a community-service work program for 
not less than 240 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the 
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail 
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sen-
tencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the 
program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term 
closely supervised follow-through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work 
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(c) Under Subsection (a)(ii) if the court suspends the execution of a 
prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,5Q0; 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,000 hours; and 
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol 
or drug dependency rehabilitation program providing intensive care 
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-
through after treatment. 
(7) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section 
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked 
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person 
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, 
treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after 
July 1, 1993, have been completed; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution and rehabilita-
tion costs assessed against the person have been paid, if the conviction 
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within 
six years of a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner 
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a 
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed 
after July 1, 1993. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in an 
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the 
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation facility; or do a combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or 
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction 
under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court 
would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, 
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), 
and (6). 
(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any 
community-based or other education program provided for in this section 
shall be approved by the Department of Human Services. 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, 
an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall 
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or 
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-44.6 or of 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this subsection. 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed 
within a period of six years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the 
court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension or revocation 
period the number of days for which a license was previously suspended 
under Section 53-3-223, if the previous suspension was based on the same 
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation 
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, or one year to remove from the highways those persons 
who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this 
subsection, the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division 
of the Department of Public Safety an order to suspend or revoke that 
person's driving privileges for a specified period of time. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943, 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, 
§ 1; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, 
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, 
§ 2;1982,ch.46,§ 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, 
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46, 
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29; 
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2; 
1988, ch. 17, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 16; 1990, 
ch. 299, § 1; 1991, ch. 147, § 1; 1993, ch. 168, 
§ 1; 1993, ch. 193, § 1; 1993, ch. 234, § 32; 
1994, ch. 159, § 1; 1994, ch. 263, § 1; 1996, 
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76-6-106. Criminal mischief. 
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys 
property with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another 
and thereby: 
(i) recklessly endangers human life; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or 
impairment of any public utility service; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; 
or 
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or 
against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train, railway car, 
or caboose, whether moving or standing. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a felony of the third degree. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(i) felony of the second degree if the actor's conduct causes or is 
intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in 
value; 
(ii) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct causes or is 
intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000 in value; 
(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is in-
tended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $300 but is less 
than $1,000 in value; and 
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is in-
tended to cause pecuniary loss less than $300 in value. 
(3) In determining the value of damages under this section, or for computer 
crimes under Section 76-6-703, the value of any computer, computer network, 
computer property, computer services, software, or data shall include the 
measurable value of the loss of use of such items and the measurable cost to 
replace or restore such items. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-106, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-6-106; 1992, ch. 14, ft 1; 
1995, ch. 291, ft 11; 1996, ch. 142, ft 1; 1997, 






Titles 76 and 77 
76-8-309* Escape and aggravated escape — Consecutive
 % 
sentences — Definitions. ~ 
(1 )A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody without 
authorization. 
(2) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the commission of an 
escape he uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or causes 
serious bodily injury to another. 
(3) Aggravated escape is a first degree felony. 
(4) Escape from a state prison is a second degree felony. 
(5) Any other escape is a third degree felony. 
(6) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape under this section 
shall run consecutively with any other sentence. 
(7) For the purposes of this part: 
(a) "Confinement" means: 
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a 
contract with the Utah Department of Corrections after being sen-
tenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided or the prisoner is not on parole; 
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or sentencing or 
housed in a county jail after sentencing and commitment and the 
sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on 
parole; or 
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest. 
(b) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or without warrant, or 
confinement in a state prison, jail, institution for secure confinement of 
juvenile offenders, or any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or 
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been terminated or 
voided or the prisoner is not on parole. A person is considered confined in 
the state prison if he: 
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of confinement from 
work release or home visit by the time designated for return; 
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole violation; 
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony commitment, 
pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections; or 
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state prison by 
correctional officers. 
(c) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official custody and includes 
persons under trustee status. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-309, enacted by L. 
1996, ch. 104, i 1; 1997, ch. 289, 5 9; 1997, 







Titles 76 and 77 
77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause 
shown and with leave of the court. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made by 
motion and shall be made within 30 days after the entry of the plea. 
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of an imprisoned person under 
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
History: C. 1953, 77-13-6, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1989, ch. 65, § 1; 1994, ch. 
16, § 1. 
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